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Ólafur Ísberg Hannesson, Reykjavik / Iceland
 
 
Transnational judicial cooperation in the light of legal pluralism: A look at 
the relationship between the EFTA Court and the Icelandic courts  
 
Abstract: Doctrines developed by the EFTA Court have placed considerable demands on national 
courts in the EFTA States. The Court now considers the EEA Agreement to form an “international 
treaty sui generis which contains a distinct legal order of its own.” It would thus seem that EEA law 
has transformed into an independent legal order, and subsequently has a claim to validity which 
emulates the self-legitimising presentation of the EU legal order. This, however, is not an empirically 
verifiable fact, but a particular understanding which arises when one adopts the viewpoint of the 
EFTA Court. EEA law takes place in a different realm when interpreted and applied in the national 
order: this realm is essentially a construction of the constitutional order. Case law shows that the 
Icelandic  Supreme  Court  is  far  from  accepting  all  EEA  judge-made  principles.  This  study  will 
describe a context of legal pluralism by reference to the Icelandic legal system and its relationship 
with the EEA legal order. To illustrate the discussion, the most important case law relative to the 
interaction between Icelandic laws and EEA law will be considered in the light of legal pluralism - 
particularly the principles of contrapunctual law designed by Miguel Maduro. The paper argues that 
the Supreme Court’s internal domestic approach to the application of EEA law will inevitably become 
a source of fragmentation unless it takes place within an institutional framework of judicial tolerance 
and judicial dialogue. 




The EEA Agreement, which is firmly entrenched in the EFTA States, has nowadays reached a 
certain level of development and implementation. The EEA legal order, through influx of new 
written legal material and judge-made law from the EFTA Court, accentuates the pluralist 
challenges facing the EFTA States. Nowadays, the classical dualist paradigm appears to be 
increasingly inadequate – descriptively as well as normatively – to explain how the EEA 
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Agreement, an international treaty sui generis comprising its own specific legal order, fits into 
domestic practice. It is apparent that even with the best intentions there will be inadvertent 
clashes between EEA law and national law, as some of the solutions adopted by the Icelandic 
legislator  may  not  always  be  in  accordance  with  solutions  derived  from  Europe.  Such 
insufficiency in the Icelandic statutory framework poses distinctive challenges for the courts. 
On the one hand, judges operate within their own domestic legal order, and derive authority 
from their national constitutions. On the other, they are under an EEA obligation to facilitate 
the application of obligations imposed by the EEA legal order and assumed by the State.  
Despite the problems posed by the development of the EEA legal order, most works on 
EEA  law  are  characterised  by  an  apparent  absence  of  any  discussion  of  legal  theoretical 
questions.  When  reading  EEA  law,  Norwegian  and  Icelandic  public  law  specialists  have 
usually limited themselves to a point of view internal to the State. This form of representation 
is conditioned by the constructs of national law and instinctively tries to fit the EEA entity 
into the familiar state-law concepts.
 The other side of the debate has adopted a point of view 
internal  to  the  separate  and  independent  EEA  system.
  An  analysis  taking  such  a  single 
“internal”  approach  towards  the  object  of  study  is  important  and  can  of  course  be  the 
“correct” one for its respective purposes. However, this is not the only view that should be 
adopted in a theoretical study of the subject matter. The paper argues that the legal reality of 
EEA law cannot be expressed with a simple reference to the dualist theory and the familiar 
state-law concepts. It maintains that a transfer of the theory of legal pluralism into the sphere 
of EEA law is necessary in order to account, descriptively and normatively, for the diversity 
within the EEA legal  order, in  general,  and the links  between national  and EEA law, in 
particular. 
In  the  last  decade,  commentators  on  international  and  European  law  have  become 
increasingly aware of the partial and limited nature of particular perspectives and explored the 
idea of pluralism for understanding the complex relationship between national, international 
and EU legal systems.
1 It is a view of  law that, according to  Neil MacCormick, “allows of  
the possibility  that different  systems can overlap and interact, without necessarily  requiring  
that  one be subordinate  or hierarchically  inferior  to the other or some third system.”
2 The 
different elements of legal pluralism, of course, do not present themselves in the same manner 
in EEA law as in EU law. Indeed, as the EEA has developed its own formal and material legal 
                                                           
1 As a theoretical term, legal pluralism first made its appearance in the 1993 article by Neil MacCormick, 
‘Beyond the Sovereign State’, 56 The Modern Law Review (1993) 1-18. The concept later gained momentum 
with the Maastricht Judgment of the German Constitutional Court (Brunner v. European Union Treaty, [1994] 1 
Common Market Law Reports). 
2 MacCormick, ibid., 8.  
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principles, it has given rise to a new arrangement between national and EEA sources of law, 
or a special form of legal pluralism. This paper argues that the pluralist approach gives us 
effective tools for analysing the behaviour and practices of the EFTA Court and the EFTA 
States‘national courts. In carrying out this pluralist analysis, Miguel Maduro’s theory of legal 
reasoning will be used as an analytical tool to open up some issues regarding the relations 
between the EEA and Icelandic legal systems. 
 
II. A look at the features of the EEA Agreement   
A close look at the EEA Agreement suggests that it was created with the purpose of extending 
the internal market and its protections for individuals to the EFTA States without creating 
supranational institutions and thus necessitating the ceding of sovereignty from the States. 
The Agreement is based on reciprocal access based on the four freedoms and an internal 
common market. The central concept for this purpose is “homogeneity”, which is the idea that 
EEA law shall, as far as possible, be interpreted and applied in the same way in the EU 
Member States and the EFTA States. Nonetheless, the EEA Agreement differs from the EU-
treaties on many aspects. Article 7 EEA states that an act corresponding to an EEC regulation 
shall  as  such be made  part of the internal  legal  order of the Contracting Parties. An act 
corresponding to an EEC directive shall be, or be made, part of their internal legal orders, but 
shall leave to the authorities of the Contracting Parties the choice of form and method of 
implementation. Furthermore, the preamble to Protocol 35 stipulates that the aim of achieving 
a homogeneous EEA, based on common rules, does not require the contracting parties to 
transfer legislative powers to any institution of the EEA. Therefore, the EEA Agreement lays 
down a somewhat dualist system for the relationship between EEA law and national law. This 
rationality informed the EFTA Court when the Court finally declared that the EU doctrines of 
direct effect and primacy could not be generated by the EEA Agreement alone, in its much-
anticipated Criminal proceedings against A judgment of October 2007.
3 It follows that there 
does  not  exist  any  requirement  on  national  courts  to  apply  a  rule  of  EEA  law  as  an 
independent rule of decision in the national legal order, when that rule is not transposed, or 
not adequately so, in domestic law. 
However, the EEA Agreement is not merely a regional treaty under international law. In 
its  so-called  “advisory  opinions”,  the  EFTA  Court  has  had  a  significant  impact  on  the 
substantive  development  of  EEA  law.  The  Court  has  encouraged  the  application  and 
effectiveness of EEA law, despite refusing to allow their direct enforcement, by supplying the 
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initial  text  of  the  Agreement  with  a  number  of  principles.  These  include  indirect  effect,
4 
“quasi-direct effect”,
5 “quasi-primacy” (see analysis below), the principle of state liability 
(see analysis below), the principle of human rights,
6 and the principle of effective judicial 
protection
7. Even though the Agreement does not explicitly provide for these doctrines, it 
contains certain elements from which these principles could be inferred with the adoption of a 
kind of teleological interpretation.
 Backed up by the recourse to the teleological interpretation, 
particularly associated with the ECJ, the EFTA Court developed its vision of the EEA to the 
extent that it now forms an “international treaty sui generis which contains a distinct legal 
order of its own.”
8 It thus seems that although engendered by public international law, EEA 
law has more in common with EU law than international law. As a general rule, EEA law is 
interpreted on the basis of its own internal criteria of validity, much like EU law grounds its 
validity on EU law norms. That is, EEA law decides by itself, by virtue of its autonomy as a 
legal order, which norms belong to it and on the content and scope of these norms. It is 
furthermore a dynamic legal order: the dynamics of the homogeneity objective require that the 
Agreement is interpreted in a dynamic fashion by way of teleological/functional interpretive 
methodology  which  differs  sharply  from  that  of  a  conventional  approach  found  in 
international law.  
 
III. Juridical pluralism in the EEA 
The  theory  of  pluralism  permits  the  existence  of  potentially  conflicting  claims  in  the 
interaction between legal orders and recognizes that such claims are equally valid from the 
internal point of view of the respective system.
9 However, this acceptance, that different legal 
orders each act as discrete units with autonomy, is only one part of the bigger picture. The 
                                                           
4 See Case E-4/01 Karlsson [2002] EFTA Court Report 240, and more recently Case E-1/07 Criminal 
proceedings against A, [2007] EFTA Court Report, 245, where the EFTA Court stated: “it is inherent in the 
objectives of the EEA Agreement [...] as well as in Article 3 EEA, that national courts are bound to interpret 
national law, and in particular legislative provisions specifically adopted to transpose EEA rules into national 
law, as far as possible in conformity with EEA law. Consequently, they must apply the interpretative methods 
recognised by national law as far as possible in order to achieve the result sought by the relevant EEA rule.” 
5 The Court held in Restamark that it follows from Protocol 35 that individuals and economic operators must be 
entitled to invoke and claim at the national level any rights that could be derived from the provisions of the EEA 
Agreement (having been made part of the respective national legal order), as long as they are unconditional and 
sufficiently precise. See Case E-1/94 Restamark [1994-1995] EFTA Court Report 15, para. 77. 
6 Case E-2/03 Ásgeirsson [2003] EFTA Ct. Rep. 185.  
7 See, for instance, Case E-2/10 Kolbeinsson, [2009-2010] EFTA Ct. Rep. 234, para. 47, where the EFTA Court 
stated that: “Article 3 EEA requires the Member States to take all measures necessary to guarantee the 
application and effectiveness of European law.” 
8 Case E-9/97 Sveinbjörnsdóttir v Iceland [1998] EFTA Ct. Rep. 95, para. 59. 
9 See, for instance, Neil MacCormick ‘The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now’, 1 European Law Journal 
(1999) 259–266.   
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theory  also  aims  to  impose  some  order  and  reduce  tensions  between  the  legal  orders  by 
allowing communication between the different perspectives.  
As Maduro puts forth, the theory considers the national legal orders and the “global legal 
order”  as  a  single  broader  common  legal  order,  organised  according  to  certain  rules  of 
engagement.
10 The characteristic element of exclusivity and separation of the legal orders 
(belonging to the same broader leg al system) is therefore accompanied by a discourse 
between those legal orders. However, whether one finds more appropriate to conceptualize 
the character of the relationship between EEA law and national law as there being one broader 
legal order (composite of the coexisting national legal systems and the EEA legal order) or 
whether the EEA should be viewed as distinct from and separate from the EFTA States’ legal 
systems, there is no doubt that EEA law cannot act autonomously from the rest of the legal 
actors. Whatever the general qualification may be, it is clear that we cannot hold such a 
transnational  governmental entity  apart from the bodies of law with  which it comes into 
contact.  The  same  can  be  said  for  the  EFTA  States’  legal  orders.  At  least  in  matters 
concerning EEA law, they have relinquished the right to act unilaterally, irrespective of the 
other legal orders. In this sense, they cannot be separated from the broader EEA system of 
which they are a part. Pluralism thus promotes the insight that there is interaction between the 
different  legal  orders.  This  begs  the  question  of  how  cooperation  and  coherence  can  be 
secured in the relations between EEA law and the law of the EFTA States.  
When this author turned to legal theorists who have been preoccupied with the theories 
of  pluralism,  it  was  Maduro  who  offered  the  right  analytical  tools  to  understand  the 
relationship between EEA and EFTA States. However, various pluralist models have been 
advanced, and the choice of tools must be justified. First, Maduro’s work remains one of the 
most fully developed with regard to the relationship between legal orders, for it gives useful 
guidance to the courts in exercising their judicial duties. More than a theory, Maduro’s notion 
of legal pluralism is a method realized through application of the principles of contrapunctual 
law, the respect of which are intended to guarantee a mutual adaptation of legal orders with 
each other.
11 Second, the process of elimination led to this choice. Most legal theorists in this 
                                                           
10 See Miguel Maduro ‘Legal Travels and the Risk of legal Jet-Lag – The Judicial and Constitutional Challenges 
of legal Globalisation’ in M. Monti et al. (eds), Economic Law and Justice in Times of Globalisation, Festschrift 
for Carl Baudenbacher (Nomos- Verlag, Baden-Baden, 2007) 175-190, at 177: “It is possible to have a coherent 
legal order in a context of competing determinations of the law so long as all the participants share the same 
commitment to a coherent legal order and adjust their competing claims in accordance with their commitment to 
engage in a coherent construction of a common legal order.”  
11 Maduro advances four contrapunctual requirements (the principles of pluralism; consistency; vertical and 
horizontal coherence; universalisability; and institutional choice). The analysis will be restricted to the first three 
principles as the implications of the fourth principle of institutional choice (which accepts that courts can only go 
so far and suggests a resort to politics) reaches beyond the scope of this paper.  
6 
field have focused much of their attention on constitutional conflicts between the EU and 
Member  States  –  i.e.,  the  question  of  ultimate  authority.  However,  within  the  EEA  it  is 
unhelpful to focus on the exceptional case of constitutional conflict, which cannot equally 
implode between the EEA and the EFTA States legal orders. The EFTA Court has not made a 
claim that EEA law is the supreme law of the land, taking primacy over conflicting national 
constitutional provisions in the EFTA States. The quasi-primay principle however requires the 
national courts to set aside a statutory provision conflicting with implemented EEA rules. 
EEA  law  therefore  does  not  contain  a  principle  of  supremacy  of  EEA  law  equal  to  the 
principle of supremacy  of EU law. Furthermore, the EFTA Court has confirmed that the 
Agreement does not demand that its norms become enforceable as EEA law, but rather that 
they become enforceable by the courts in the EFTA States as transformed national law. There 
are consequently no questions that need to be resolved to determine that the EFTA States’ 
constitutional law takes precedence over any other national law, including implemented EEA 
law. Instead, the attention should be directed to the interaction between national and EEA law 
on a daily basis and cases of conflicts of a legal nature. Maduro’s contrapunctual principles 
therefore offer effective tools for analysing the behaviour and practices of the EFTA Court 
and Icelandic courts, as they are intended to “guide the ordinary state of affairs”
12 in the day-
to-day  application of European  and, more  generally, transnational law
13 in different legal 
orders. Furthermore, although initially developed with regard to EU law, the contrapunctual 
setting is not exclusive to the EU.
14   
 
IV. The Sveinbjörnsdóttir and Einarsson cases 
The EFTA Court’s Sveinbjörnsdóttir (state liability) and Einarsson (quasi-primacy) cases and 
the Supreme Court’s reaction to them are perhaps the best examples of how the EEA can be 
understood as the product of a discursive practice among the courts of a broader or “common 
legal order”. Thus, in order to demonstrate how the EEA and Icelandic legal orders interact, 
despite differences in their conceptions of EEA law, Maduro’s principles will be applied to 
these well-known cases. However, before doing so, a brief look at the judgments is in order.  
                                                           
12 Miguel Maduro ‘Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s Constitutional Pluralism in Action’ in Neil Walker (ed.), 
Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003) 501-537, at 532. 
13 See Miguel Maduro, supra note 10.   
14 This was made apparent in Maduro’s contribution to a festschrift in honour of Dr. Carl Baudenbacher, 
president of the EFTA Court, where the author moves his framework to a wider regional context. See Miguel 
Maduro, ibid.  
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The  EFTA  Court’s  1998  Sveinbjörnsdóttir  case,
15  concerned  Iceland's  failure  to 
(correctly)  implement  Directive  80/987/  EEC  on  the  protection  of  employees  against 
insolvent  employers  and  the  liability  of  an  EFTA  State.  In  the  absence  of  any  textual 
foundation, the Court held that it was a principle of the EEA Agreement that EFTA States 
must compensate damage caused to individuals by violations of EEA law imputed to them. In 
setting out its arguments, the Court interpreted the Agreement as being something more than a 
mere regional set of norms of international law: 
 
The Court concludes [...] that the EEA Agreement is an international treaty sui generis which 
contains a distinct legal order of its own. [...] The depth of integration of the EEA Agreement is 
less  far-reaching  than  under  the  EC  Treaty,  but  the  scope  and  the  objective  of  the  EEA 
Agreement goes beyond what is usual for an agreement under public international law.
16 
 
In a later passage, the Court states: 
 
The Court finds that the homogeneity objective and the objective of establishing the right of 
individuals and economic operators to equal treatment and equal opportunities are so strongly 
expressed  in  the  EEA  Agreement  that  the  EFTA  States  must  be  obliged  to  provide  for 




To briefly summarize the reasoning in Sveinbjörnsdóttir, the Court provided several legal 
justifications for its intervention through the state liability doctrine. The Court rejected a wide 
interpretation of Article 6 EEA as the basis of EEA law state liability and resisted making any 
reference  to  the  ECJ  case  law.  It  rather  relied  on  the  interrelated  concepts  of  purposes, 
homogeneity, role played by individuals, loyal cooperation and nature of the EEA Agreement. 
Consequently, the principle was necessitated by the underlying need for rendering EEA rights 
effective, i.e., on functional grounds. 
Subsequent to the EFTA Court ruling, the Icelandic Supreme Court (Hrd. 1999.4916) 
emphasized that, in accordance with the Icelandic Constitution, it had to assess independently 
whether state liability had a legal basis in domestic law. It noted that it follows from the 
loyalty obligation in Article 3 EEA, in combination with Article 7 EEA, that Iceland is under 
a duty to implement Community acts - which have been adopted by the EEA joint Committee 
                                                           
15 Case E-9/97 Sveinbjörnsdóttir  v Iceland [1998] EFTA Ct. Rep. 95. 
16 Sveinbjörnsdóttir, at para. 59. 
17 Sveinbjörnsdóttir, at para. 60  
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- and to accord individuals their rights leading from them. It further held that if the directive at 
issue had been properly implemented, Ms. Sveinbjörnsdóttir would have received payment of 
her wage claims. It then stated that, while the EEA agreement did not entail a transfer of 
legislative  powers,  the  text  of  the  agreement  had  been  enacted  in  national  law.  It  then 
stipulated: 
 
...  [i]t  is  appropriate  that  the  act,  giving  legal  force  to  the  main  part  of  the  Agreement,  is 
interpreted in such a way that individuals have a claim to Icelandic legislation being brought in 
harmony with EEA rules. Insofar this is not accomplished, it follows from Act No 2/1993 and the 
fundamental principles and purposes of the EEA Agreement that [the state] undertakes a liability 
under Icelandic law. Based on this, as well as the origins and purposes of act No. 2/1993, the duty 
of [the state] to pay compensation because of the unsatisfactory implementation of the directive 
has sufficient legal basis in that act. 
 
To  summarize,  it  follows  from  the  judgment  that  the  Supreme  Court  recognizes  this 
obligation of the Icelandic State as valid, within its jurisdiction, only because of Icelandic 
legislation in the form of the internal EEA Act. It thus follows that the application of the 
obligation is controlled by the national courts. 
We  now  turn  to  the  EFTA  Court‘s  Einarsson  judgment,
18  which  concerned  a 
differentiated taxation scheme for books in Iceland. The Reykjavík District Court raised the 
question of whether the EEA Agreement contains any provisions dictating what rules should 
apply  if  the  Icelandic  law  relevant  in  the  case  was  deemed  incompatible  with  the  EEA 
Agreement. The Icelandic Government argued that the EEA Agreement does not contain any 
specific rules on the issue of conflict between national rules and EEA rules. It submitted that 
Protocol 35 simply imposes a duty on EFTA States to introduce a statutory provision to the 
effect that EEA rules are to prevail in cases of conflict between implemented EEA rules and 
other statutory provisions, but as clearly stated in the preamble to Protocol 35, this must be 
achieved though national measures.
19   
The  EFTA  Court,  however,  rejected  the  Government’s  proposition  and  adopted  an 
expansive interpretation of the Protocol’s scope. It stated that if a provision of national law is 
incompatible with implemented EEA law, “... a situation has arisen which is governed by the 
undertaking  assumed  by  the  EFTA  States  under  Protocol  35  to  the  EEA  Agreement,  the 
premise of which is that the implemented EEA rule shall prevail.” The EFTA Court’s view is, 
                                                           
18 Case E-1/01 Einarsson [2002] EFTA Court Report 1.  
19 Written Observations from intervening parties in the Case, para. 70.   
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therefore, that it flows from Protocol 35 that EEA rules introduced into the EFTA States legal 
order must prevail over conflicting internal provisions, provided they are unconditional and 
sufficiently  precise.  The  president  of  the  EFTA  Court,  Carl  Baudenbacher,  who  himself 
participated in the case, asserts that the decision established “quasi-primacy” as a principle 
which follows directly from the EEA Agreement.
20   
In continuation of the advisory opinion of the EFTA Court, the Supreme Court came to 
the conclusion that the differentiated taxation scheme was in breach of the special prohibition 
of discriminatory taxation under Article 14 EEA.  The Supreme Court, however , did not 
regard itself under an EEA law obligation, independently of national law, to grant EEA-based 
law priority. The Court did not consider the EEA rule in Protocol 35, but preferred to interpret 
its national counterpart provision in Article 3 of the  Icelandic EEA Act and the statute’s 
preparatory work, which introduces the concept of EEA law as “special law” (lex specialis)
21 
It  resolved  the  conflict  between  the  EEA  Agreement  and  the  domestic  provision  in  the 
following way:   
 
The second paragraph of Article 14 EEA which provides that “no Contracting Party shall impose 
on the products of other Contracting Parties any internal taxation of such a nature as to afford 
indirect protection to other products”, must be defined as a special provision regarding taxation 
on imports from other EEA States, which takes precedence over Article 14(6) of the previously 
enacted legislative Act No. 50/1988, providing for a preferential VAT rate on books in Icelandic. 
After the EEA Agreement was given the force of law under the Icelandic legal system through 
the adoption of Act No. 2/1993 it was therefore unlawful to differentiate value-added tax applied 
to books in the Icelandic language and books in foreign languages. (italics added). 
 
Thus, it is Article 3 of the Icelandic EEA Act which authorizes and permits the application of 
EEA-based law in place of contrary national legislation. The Supreme Court’s case therefore 
                                                           
20 Carl Baudenbacher ‘The EFTA Court Ten Years On’ The EFTA Court Ten Years On (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2005) 13-55, at 26. 
21 The undertaking in the sole article of Protocol 35 was believed to be fulfilled by the legislature with Article 3 
of Act No. 2/1993 (hereinafter referred to as the EEA Act). The Article which was adopted specifically in order 
to comply with the Protocol states that:  
“Statutes and regulations shall be interpreted, in so far as appropriate, in accordance with the EEA Agreement 
and the rules deriving from it.” 
The obligation of Protocol 35 is, not easily transferable to this interpretation rule which, crucially, does not 
import such a “primacy provision”. The travaux préparatoires to the provision, however, declares:  
“Article 3 of the EEA Act entails, inter alia, that implemented EEA rules will be considered as special provisions 
in relation to incompatible subsequent legislation in order to consider them as remaining in force in cases of 
possible conflict, unless the legislator specifically said otherwise. This is necessary to ensure a uniform 
interpretation of the provisions of the EEA-agreement.”  
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suggested that, in the form of a lex specialis principle, a national complementary version of 
the “quasi-primacy” principle had been developed.  
 
V. Miguel Maduro’s contrapunctual principles 
The above cases show that from the EFTA Court‘s point of view, EEA law has transformed 
into an independent legal order and subsequently has a claim to validity emulating the self-
legitimising presentation of the EU legal order. However, the enforcement of EEA law is not 
a one-way, top-down process.  Although the EFTA Court has created doctrines that have put 
real teeth into the EEA, it is clear that, in the absence of a transfer of sovereign powers, the 
Court  must  rely  even  more  than  the  ECJ  on  cooperative  action.  EEA  law  can  thus  be 
described as a product of inter-judicial discourse and an on-going, though not always tranquil, 
dialogue between the  EFTA States‘ national  courts  and the ECJ/EFTA Court, as  well  as 
between national law and EEA law principles. The truth of the matter is that the dynamic way 
in which the law of the EEA and the law of the EFTA States interact poses a number of new 
and difficult questions that cannot be adequately explained by the adoption of the static state-
law-centred, dualist or positivist method. The general understanding of this relationship must 
be placed on a different conceptual basis. This study argues that an account based on a theory 
of  legal  pluralism  is  better  equipped  to  explain  the  relationship  between  EEA  law  and 
domestic law. Such a theory is more likely to produce concepts that may shed light on how 
judges understand and operate in this field.  
 
1. The plurality of jurisdictions and legal sources 
The pluralist theory is based on a mutual recognition of authority. Thusly, Maduro’s first 
contrapunctual principle postulates that the courts should be aware that they are acting in a 
pluralist legal order: 
 
... all legal orders must mutually recognize each other and their right to ‘self-determination’. 
Therefore, the globalization of the law, which has been described as creating a form of legal and 
constitutional  pluralism,  imposes  the  recognition  and  adjustment  of  each  legal  order  to  the 
plurality of equally legitimated claims of authority made by other legal orders.
22  
 
To apply this principle would mean that “no legal order should be forced to abandon its own 
internal viewpoint.”
23 It thus retains a certain form of dualism. 
                                                           
22 Miguel Maduro, supra note 10, 177. 
23 Miguel Maduro, supra note 12, 526.  
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The observed cases show a reciprocal understanding between the EFTA Court and the 
Supreme  Court,  as  both  courts  acted  in  accordance  with  this  principle.  By  virtue  of  the 
authority  of  EEA  law  as  a  legal  order,  the  EFTA  Court  looked  to  the  EEA-system  as 
sufficient ground for the creation of its doctrines. However, it managed to balance the weight 
of its claim against the constitutional set-up in the Nordic dualist legal systems, where there is 
a strong tradition of legislative authority. In order to make the doctrine of state liability less 
intrusive for the national judiciaries, the EFTA Court stated that since the principle of state 
liability is an integral part of the EEA Agreement, “it is natural to interpret national legislation 
implementing  the  main  part  of  the  Agreement  as  also  comprising  the  principle  of  state 
liability”.
24 In theory, this remark is applicable to all general principles, and the EFTA Court 
used a similar approach in Einarsson, by referring to the Icelandic court’s discretion under the 
grounding provision of Article 3 of the EEA Act. It, however, made clear that it was not for 
the  EFTA  Court  to  rule  on  the  interpretation  of  provisions  of  national  legislation,  which 
remained the concern of the national courts.
25   
This is an interesting manifestation of dialogue between the courts which might be 
explained by the political background surrounding the EEA Agreement. As the EEA does not 
form a supranational regime that imposes itself on the national regime to the same extent as 
the EU, the EFTA Court takes a somewhat different approach than the ECJ when it introduces 
new legal concepts. The EFTA Court accepts that the dualist tradition in the Nordic States 
disqualifies these principles from having “direct effect”, and national courts might have to 
arrive  at  the  correct  application  of  EEA  law  in  a  different  manner.  Therefore,  the  Court 
embraces a more heterogeneous understanding of these principles and, as  a result of this 
collaborative attitude vis-a-vis the national courts, it manages to mitigate the disruption to 
internal procedures. 
The Icelandic Supreme Court, in both Sveinbörnsdóttir and Einarsson, was faced with 
the methodological problem of how to give effect to these EEA principles in the national 
system. The above analysis of the cases shows that the Supreme Court solved this dilemma by 
allowing compliance with these EEA obligations by reference to its own internal criteria of 
validity. It, however, respected the EFTA Court’s viewpoint and did not question the formal 
                                                           
24 See Sveinbjörnsdóttir, para. 63. In the literature there seems to be a certain conceptual confusion regarding the 
EFTA Court’s legal basis for this interpretive obligation. Many critics, who have commented on this paragraph, 
claim that: the EFTA Court exceeds its task since it is not for the Court to express itself on the interpretation of 
the EEA transformation act, which is national law. The author, however, agrees with Davíð Björgvinsson’s 
stance that the Court’s statement in no way dictates the application of the transformed EEA act, but simply 
reminds its national counterpart of the duty to interpret national law in the light of its EEA obligation. A duty 
that follows from national law in the EFTA States as well as the EEA obligation in Article 3 of the Agreement. 
See, Davíð Björgvinsson, EES-réttur og landsréttur (Bókaútgáfan CODEX, Reykjavík, 2006) 345-346. 
25 Sveinbjörnsdóttir, para. 18 and Einarsson, para. 48.   
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grounding of validity, or “legitimacy” of the doctrines. The attitude of the Supreme Court is 
not in the least surprising. The Court, of course, remains a national institution - even when it 
applies EEA law materials - and is, to a large extent, constrained by its institutional position. 
Just like the EFTA Court draws authority from the Agreement, Icelandic courts view their 
authority as based upon the Icelandic legal system. Therefore, it is entirely logical that the 
Court  would  adopt  a  point  of  view  internal  to  its  legal  order  to  determine  valid  legal 
arguments  and  the  weight  to  be  given  to  them.  The  Supreme  Court  must  find  a  way  of 
justifying its action in a way that agrees with the Icelandic legal system.  
 
2. Consistency and coherence 
Secondly, the courts should seek to safeguard the integrity and coherence of the law in such a 
context of competing legal orders. Maduro proposes that: 
 
“Such claims of jurisdiction over transnational situations must be accompanied by a commitment 
to take into account the potential effects of the decision of a particular legal order in other legal 
orders. In reality, the global law arising from the regulation of transnational situations ends up 
being a product of the interaction between different national and international legal orders. In this 
context, any judicial body (national or international) must reason and justify its decisions in the 
context of the global legal order in which they are impacting.”
26 
 
This means that national courts must decide “transnational legal cases” so as to make those 
decisions fit the decisions taken by international judicial bodies, even if they reach them with 
different arguments and normative starting points.
27 In both Sveinbjörnsdóttir and Einarsson, 
the Supreme Court accepted the binding force of the EEA law doctrines and reconciled them 
with national constitutional requirements. The fact that the Supreme Court emphasized the 
exclusively national legal basis of those doctrines in Icelandic law evidently does not imply 
that the EFTA Court’s ruling had not been given great significance.
28 The pluralist discourse 
appears in both decisions as the Court announced that particularly compelling reasons were 
necessary not to accept the decisions of the EFTA Court. 
3. Universalisability 
Thirdly,  the  courts  should  reason  in  universal  terms,  thus  taking  into  account  the 
consequences to the “global legal order”. “[A]ny judicial body (national or international) must 
reason and justify its decisions in the context of the global legal order in which they are 
                                                           
26 Miguel Maduro, supra note 10, 177. 
27 Ibid., and Miguel Maduro, supra note 12, 527-528.  
28 Davíð Björgvinsson, supra note 24, 224.  
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impacting.”  This,  Maduro  explains,  means  that  “[s]uch  decisions  must  be  grounded  in  a 
doctrine that could be applied by any other court in a similar situation, including, in this 
context, the courts of a different legal order.”
29 
To one familiar with EU law, this version of the principle of universalisability could be 
characterized  as  a  sort  of  CILFIT-doctrine.
30  Here, the differences between the practices 
relating to the EU and those relating to the EEA must be considered. We would suggest that 
Maduro’s requirement here does not fit the actual judicial experience relating to the EEA. The 
legal order is simply too heterogeneous in its features for the national courts of the EFTA 
States to accept that sort of universal character of legal reasoning. In fact, even in the EU 
context, this principle has been debated: Florence Giorgi and Nicolas Triart ask if making the 
terms of jurisprudence universal does not erase the aims of pluralism. In their opinion, the 
notion  of  pluralism  is  about  “the  recognition  and  the  expression  of  particularities  and 
differences, more than the fabrication of a universal”.  
Indeed, it does seem as though this theory of legal reasoning does not accommodate the 
pluralistic conception of the relationship between legal systems, which Maduro wishes to 
offer. The first two principles of contrapunctual law acknowledge national variations in the 
reasoning of the national courts. Thus, requiring “the courts of a different legal order” to 
modify their approach to what they might be expected to approve of could be said to subvert 
the  nature  of  the  first  two  principles.  The  limitations  of  such  an  exercise  also  become 
immediately apparent once we ask how it would work in practice: first, how should judges 
identify the approach other courts might adopt – assuming that such an approach is even clear 
to those “other” courts – and second, what courts should be identified? It should also be noted 
that concepts, methods of judicial reasoning, interpretive techniques and the role of the courts 
can vary significantly across different jurisdictions, which would make it difficult to draw 
conclusions  from  the  experience  of  other  courts.  This  heterogeneity  was  elucidated  by 
Catherine Richmond in a thesis defended in 2000. For Richmond, a pluralist community can 
never speak in a single voice: 
 
[i]t may be that in an ideal political community, there would be such harmony that adjudication 
can and should be conducted on the assumption that the law speaks with one voice. However, we 
have seen that in the European Union, there is such dissonance that on certain issues, the respect 
for difference must outweigh the desire for unity.
31  
                                                           
29 Miguel Maduro, supra note 10, 177. 
30 Case 238/81, CILFIT, [1982] ECR 3415. 
31 Catherine Richmond, Perspectives on Law: System, Authority and Legitimacy in the European Union (PhD  
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This observation leads to the criticism that Maduro’s calls for increased unity through the 
principle of universalisability might be considered impossibly idealistic for the EU, let alone 
the greater problems it would face due to the nature of EEA law. Hence, a more careful 
balancing act is required between the quest for “consistency and coherence” and the national 
claim to authority. However, Maduro’s method makes it clear that national courts are free to 
find  solutions  according  to  their  own  methods  and  viewpoints.
32  This necessarily means 
acknowledging differences between the Member States in the application of European law. It 
thus seems reasonable to conclude that Maduro’s statement, that decisions must be grounded 
in a doctrine that could be applied by any other court in a similar situation, is not intended to 
be  taken  too  literally.  The  rationale  behind  the  principle  is  that  it  facilitates  a  dialogue 
amongst  courts  and  “prevents  courts  from  deciding  transnational  legal  cases  in  a  purely 
‘domestic’ manner.”
33 Courts can achieve this objective by simply providing clearer reasons 
and rationales in support of their interpretations and taking into account the consequences of 
their decisions on the European level. 
 It is on the strength of this conclusion that we may now 
move on to an analysis of whether the Supreme Court fully satisfied the principle.  
On the basis of this conclusion, the principle was probably fully satisfied in Einarsson. 
The Supreme Court respected the supremacy of implemented EEA law by adopting, at the 
national level, a lex specialis type of rule, thus coming to a mutual accommodation of both the 
EEA and Icelandic legal order. Here, it is submitted that, if consistently adopted in practice, 
the  application  of  lex  specialis  will  contribute  a  degree  of  predictability  and  coherence 
regarding  such  conflict  resolutions.
34  From  these  premises  it  may  be  concluded  that  the 
justification for privileging transformed EEA law due to its “special” character is consistent 
with the idea of the universalisability of reasoning (although perhaps not it the strictest sense 
of Maduro’s version of the principle).  
The legal reasoning of the Supreme Court in Sveinbjörnsdóttir met, without question, the 
universalizability  test  and,  as  a  result,  became  an  important  contribution  to  the  general 
development  of  EEA  law.  First,  it  recognised  the  principle  of  state  liability  as  part  of 
Icelandic law and hence provided for this legal basis to be employed in future cases. Second, 
its guiding value reached beyond Iceland, which became evident as it resonated in the 2005 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Thesis, European University Institute, Florence 2000), 223. 
32 Miguel Maduro, supra note 12, 525-527. 
33 Miguel Maduro, supra note 10, 177. 
34 This is consistent with what is generally accepted as the universal character of legal reasoning; see e.g. Neil 
MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), 99.  
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Norwegian Supreme Court’s Finanger II case.
35 The Norwegian Supreme Court came to the 
conclusion that liability for the State followed from  the internal Norwegian EEA Act, based 
on the same argument as in the Icelandic Supreme Court’s Sveinbjörnsdóttir.
36  
It can be inferred from the above examples of  Sveinbjörnsdóttir and Einarsson that the 
EFTA Court and the Supreme Court try to minimize the risk of conflicts by accommodating 
their respective claims. The Supreme Court accommodated the claims of both the EEA and 
the national legal orders by adopting an internal approach taking into account the demands 
arising  from  the  EEA  law  doctrines.  As  we  saw  above,  this  internal  approach  was  fully 
consistent with what Maduro perceives to be the principles of legal pluralism. Hence, it has a 
sound basis in pluralistic legal theory.   
 
VI. The pitfalls – Isolationistic Interpretations 
The methodology of recurring to national law in order to ensure judicial protection of EEA 
law rights in the EFTA States chimes well with the formal character of EEA law as public 
international law. However, unless this practice takes place within an institutional framework 
of judicial tolerance and judicial dialogue (e.g. the contrapunctual model of interpretation), 
such an internal approach inevitably, to quote Giorgi and Triart, “leads the judge to consider 
himself at the centre of the legal universe.”
37 It involves the risk that the courts might prefer to 
deny the protection of an alleged EEA law right when the proper national rule on which to 
base a decision is not in place, instead of looking for solutions as to how to interpret Icelandic 
law in conformity with EEA obligations. 
The Supreme Court’s  approach in  Sveinbjörnsdóttir and Einarsson are two examples 
where the Court in an exemplary manner applied the EFTA Court’s doctrines. However, it 
must be observed that the cases were a direct result of the interpretive advice on points of 
EEA law, which the Icelandic courts had requested under Article 34 Surveillance and Court 
Agreement (SCA). The Supreme Court has hitherto never explicitly rejected such a decision 
and by its own account will not do so unless justified reasons require it to do so. Thus, these 
two cases might not tell us the whole story about the current practical situation of EEA law in 
                                                           
35 Rt. 2005: 1365 (Finanger II). 
36 In paragraph 52 of the judgment, the Judge Rapporteur stated: “I endorse the view that there is a presumption 
of State liability in the EEA Agreement, and that s.1 of the EEA Act, which implemented the main part of the 
EEA Agreement into Norwegian law, must be interpreted so as to include such liability. I note that the State has 
expressed the same view and that the Supreme Court of Iceland came to the same conclusion in the 
Sveinbjörnsdóttir case.” See Common Market Law Reports (2006), issue 1611, p. 378. See also discussion in 
Örlygsson, Þ. (2007), p. 47. 
37 Florence Giorgi and Nicolas Triart, ‘National Judges, Community Judges: Invitation to a Journey through the 
Looking-Glass – On the Need for Jurisdictions to Rethink the Inter-systemic Relations beyond the Hierarchical 
Principle’, 14 European Law Journal (2008) 693-717, at 693.  
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Icelandic courts. Case law analysis shows that the Supreme Court has a propensity to find that 
EEA  law  is  not  of  relevance  to  the  issues  at  hand  -  when  faced  with  difficult  decisions 
involving a prima facie tension between EEA law and national law. It is possible to identify 
this judicial tendency to circumvent EEA law in two distinct stages. First, the Supreme Court 
tends to refuse cooperation with the EFTA Court - and as a result elements of EEA law - with 
the argument that the dispute is not really about the interpretation of EEA law but about 
matters  of  national  or  constitutional  law.  Second,  the  Supreme  Court  endeavours  only  to 
ascertain that the domestic solution found does not violate EEA law, while relying on the 
black letter of national law. The distinction between the two categories is not so clear but 
serves as an analytical device to give structure to the study. 
 
1. Refusing Discourse: Safeguarding the autonomy of the Icelandic legal order 
Davíð Þór Björgvinsson has discussed the approach of the Icelandic Supreme Court towards 
referring questions to the EFTA Court. The author has made observations on a case from 
2004 (Hrd. 2004.3097) which concerned a refusal to grant the claimant authorisation to place 
on the market a particular proprietary medicinal product. The claimant claimed to have met all 
the conditions provided for in the relevant Icelandic legislation,
38 which was based on certain 
EEA Directives.
39 He thought it necessary to make a reference to the EFTA Court in order to 
clarify the correct interpretation of certain provisions of the directives. The Reykjavík District 
Court accepted the claimant’s argument and decided to refer the matter to the EFTA Court. 
That ruling was, however, overturned by the Supreme Court.
 In its refusal to refer, the Court 
first noted that the EFTA Court’s authority is restricted to the interpretation of EEA law. It 
then held: 
 
The assessment of evidence and the factual circumstances of the case, as well as interpretation of 
domestic legislation and acts referred to in the annexes to the EEA Agreement that have been 
made part of domestic legislation, fall upon the Icelandic courts.
40 
 
The Supreme Court first makes clear that it is a matter for the national courts to ascertain 
whether EEA law, which has been transposed into national law, is applicable to the facts of 
the case and assess its influence on the resolution of the dispute brought before them. This 
                                                           
38 Administrative Regulation No. 462/2006. 
39 Council Directive 65/65/EEC and Directive 2001/83/EC. 
40 Here cited in English from Davíð Björgvinsson, ‘Application of Article 34 of the ESA/Court Agreement by 
Icelandic Courts’,  in M. Monti et al. (eds), Economic Law and Justice in Times of Globalisation, Festschrift for 
Carl Baudenbacher (Nomos- Verlag, Baden-Baden, 2007), 45.  
17 
line  of  demarcation  in  the  co-operative  relationship  has  similarly  been  confirmed  by  the 
EFTA Court.
41 What is remarkable in the present context, however, is that the Court in fact 
proceeds to say that it lies outsi de the EFTA Court’s competence to express itself on the 
interpretation of EEA law which has been made part of national law. Such interpretation 
becomes, through the transformation of the former, a matter pertaining entirely to the internal 
coherence of the domestic legal order.  
Although the case concerned the question of whether or not to make a reference to the 
EFTA Court, it gives us a certain understanding of the Icelandic judiciary’s approach when 
having to interpret law to comply with EEA obligations. It is an example of the Court’s 
inflexibility in relation to adjusting its traditional method of reasoning to the new reality that 
the EEA legal order brings. The EFTA States are obliged to ensure that those concerned by a 
directive can enjoy the rights granted by EEA law. However, the Supreme Court expressed 
the position that an interpretation of the directives themselves could not have a bearing on the 
case  at  hand  as  it  had  been  incorporated  into  the  Icelandic  legal  system  and  thus  fully 
complied with.  The case is an example of how the Supreme Court tends to adhere to a textual 
positivist reasoning: what is not laid down in written legal statutes should not be taken into 
account. This further suggests that the Court is not accustomed to having to comply with 
unwritten EEA law by way of judicial interpretation.  
Even more astonishing, in many respects, is the the mode of reasoning by the Reykjavík 
District  Court,  in  a  decision  which  was  confirmed  by  the  Supreme  Court  in  its  alcohol 
advertisement  case  from  24  May  2006.
42    The defendant claimed that a total prohibition 
against alcohol advertising was in breach of certain provisions of the EEA Agreement, and 
requested an advisory opinion from the EFTA Court. In its response, the Supreme Court, 
however, dispensed with the interpretive request on the argument that the issue was not really 
about the interpretation of EEA law but about matters of national constitutional law, which 
are not within the EFTA Court’s competence.
43 Thus, the Court saw the case through the 
exclusive prism of the Icelandic Constitution. This formalistic approach, however, seems to 
forget one detail: constitutional rights and EEA rights coexist. Shifting the emphasis towards 
                                                           
41 Case E-2/95, Eidesund, [1995-1996] EFTA Ct. Rep. 1, para 46. 
42 Supreme Court judgment in case No. 274/2006. 
43 In response to the question of whether or not a referral to the EFTA Court had to be made the District Court 
stated: 
“Similar cases have been argued before the [Icelandic] courts. In these cases it has been disputed that Article 20 
of the Act on Alcoholic Beverages is in accordance with constitutional provisions on freedom of expression, 
property rights and equality and discrimination. The disputed issue in this case, as in the earlier cases, concerns 
the validity and interpretation of Article 20 of the Act on Alcoholic Beverages and whether it is compatible with 
constitutional provisions, but legislation which has been adopted according to constitutional standards cannot 
be set aside on any other grounds. The EFTA Court does not deal with such legal interpretation. It is therefore of 
no relevance to request an advisory opinion in this case.” (Italics added)  
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the  constitutionality  of  the  contested  provision  doesn’t  exclude  the  view  point  of  EEA 
affected interest.
44 
Davíð Björgvinsson has maintained that the reluctance detected in the two above cases, 
to take advantage of the advisory opinion procedure, can be traced partly to the Supreme 
Court’s efforts to protect the autonomy of Icelandic system. This approach – the author notes 
– could, however, easily lead to a situation where a person is entitled to certain rights under 
EEA  law,  but  would  be  denied  from  taking  advantage  of  those  rights  before  Icelandic 
courts.
45    
 
2. Arriving at a result complying with EEA law by way of “isolationistic” solutions  
The Supreme Court’s strategy of limiting itself to an application of domestic sources of law 
can be seen in the previously analysed cases. In another remarkable constitutional case of 
2006 (the Tobacco Case
46) the claimant sought a declaration that a provision in the Icelandic 
Tobacco Control Act, that restricted the display of tobacco products in retail stores, was 
inoperative as it was contrary to Articles 11 and 36 of the E EA Agreement. The Supreme 
Court, however, found a way to avoid ruling on the heated issue as it examined the dispute 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  Constitution,  and  declared  unconstitutional  the  outright 
prohibition of the display of tobacco products.   This  case is in line with cases regarding 
prohibitions on the advertising and marketing of alcohol, where the Court argued that the 
cases primarily involve constitutional questions and EEA law is therefore not relevant.
47 
A combined reading of the two constitut ional decisions from 2006 seems to imply that 
the only standards which the Supreme Court is willing to uphold are those of its Constitution. 
The Icelandic constitutional tradition may go a long way toward explaining why the Supreme 
Court, faced with the al ternative of reviewing domestic legislative acts on the basis of 
standards provided by EEA-based law or the Constitution, will choose the latter option. The 
Supreme  Court’s  mandate  upholding  the  Constitution  is  -  as  Ragnhildur  Helgadóttir  has 
observed - beyond dispute.
48 Hence, constitutional judicial review would never cause as much 
                                                           
44 In EU law, for comparison, the national courts are always welcome with questions, or obliged to refer, even 
though the case raises constitutional issues. See for example the Mecanarte case (C-348/89, ECR 1991, I-3277), 
para. 44-46.  
45 Davíð Björgvinsson, supra note 40, 45. Such situations have been defined by Neil MacCormick as examples 
of “radical pluralism”. It takes its name from the fact that there remains a possibility of different answers from 
the point of view of different systems. See Neil MacCormick supra note 9, 259–266. 
46 Supreme Court judgment in case No. 220/2005. 
47 See Hrd. 2006:2646 (Alcohol Advertising I), Hrd. 14 June 2007 Case 599/2006 (Alcohol Advertising II) and 
Hrd. 25 February 2008 Case 60/2008 (Alcohol Advertising III).  
48 In a 2009 article, on the history of the Icelandic judicial review, Ragnhildur Helgadóttir states that “Icelandic 
courts unhesitatingly and openly exercise judicial review. They are not apologetic about their role as reviewers 
of the constitutionality of parliamentary action.” Her conclusion was that, “irrespective of individual  
19 
dissent as review of domestic legislative acts on the basis of EEA-based law, which may even 
be contested on constitutional grounds. Against this background, it is perhaps not entirely 
surprising that the Supreme Court has so far been reluctant to refer to EEA-based law, at least 
when it would mean setting aside “purely” national law. 
Another case in point would be the much discussed Hrd. 2001.3451, on the motor vehicle 
insurance directives. Rather than following the district court’s approach and relying on the 
interpretation obligation to the effect that Icelandic legislation is interpreted to be consistent 
with the EFTA Court’s understanding of the directives, a traditional cautious attitude to the 
exercise of EEA law was expressed. The Court restricted its scrutiny strictly to domestic law 
in the resolution of the case but, nevertheless, managed to arrive at a result bringing national 
law into conformity with the EFTA Court’s understanding of the Directives. Using a quite 
complicated train of reasoning, based on developments in national law, the Supreme Court 
attempted to dress up its holding in a legal costume. The Court thereby steered clear of the 
risk of infringing the claimant’s EEA law rights and any action against the Icelandic State for 
compensation.  
The  last  example  which  will  be  cited  to  illustrate  the  point  is  Hrd.  2001.2505  (the 
Íslandsbanki-FBA case). This case concerned Icelandic legislation which imposed a higher 
fee on state guarantees in respect of foreign loans than in respect of loans considered to be 
domestic. In a dispute concerning the question of whether the Nordic Investment Bank was a 
domestic or foreign entity,
49 the Reykjavík District Court asked the EFTA Court whether the 
unequal treatment of loans was compatible with Article 40 EEA. The EFTA Court considered 
such an arrangement to be incompatible with the principle of free movement of capital laid 
down in Article 40 EEA. Before the Reykjavík District Court, the case concerned the issue of 
conflict between EEA-based rules and subsequent statutory provisions. In continuation of the 
advisory opinion, the District Court found that the defendant could invoke and rely on the 
rights granted by Article 40 EEA, in  effect applying a provision of the Agreement even in 
presence of subsequent contrary national legislation. Upon appeal, however, the Supreme 
Court simply considered the bank in question to be a domestic entity. As a result, the state 
guarantee was not to be subject to the guarantee fees payable on loans from foreign entities. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
controversial cases, the courts play an important and largely uncontroversial role in the constitutional scheme.” 
Thus, there is “little subterfuge and disguising of constitutional review.” See R. Helgadóttir, ‘Status Presens- 
Judicial Review in Iceland’, Nordisk Tidsskrift for Menneskerettigheter, vol. 27(2), 185-193, at 192. 
49 The Ministry of Finance had confirmed that the Nordic Investment Bank should be considered a foreign entity 
and that the state guarantee should be subject to the guarantee fees payable on loans from foreign entities.  The 
Defendant did not accept the decision by the Ministry of Finance and paid the guarantee fees on the obligations 
to the Nordic Investment Bank as if the obligations were in favour of a domestic entity. The claimant thus 
initiated proceedings before the Reykjavik City Court and claimed the payment of the guarantee fees on the 
assumption that the Nordic Investment Bank is a foreign entity.  
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Since EEA law has no competence to govern exclusively internal situations, the disputed 
intra-EEA law element was avoided altogether. 
The above case law is interesting from a methodological perspective. A feature which 
appears quite clearly is that the Supreme Court increasingly substitutes wider international 
perspectives,  to  which  EEA  law  sources  of  law  are  central,  for  the  purely  national  legal 
perspective.
50 This approach of the Supreme Court, however, does not mean that EEA law has 
not been given a substantially influential role in the legal outcome of a case. By preferring an 
extensive interpretation of Icelandic law in a way which ensures that EEA law standards are 
complied with indeed raises suspicions of an unstated interpretation of Icelandic law in the 
light of EEA law. One could argue that this does not pose any problems as such a disguised 
form of giving effect to EEA law allows the court to do what it thinks is justice in th e 
concrete case before it, i.e. rule in favour of a litigant whose EEA rights have been violated. 
On the other hand, such an approach of concealing a conflict between EEA law and another 
statute is arguably more of a judicial usurpation of power which is o nly likely to bring about 
disharmony between the EFTA Court and national courts. It neutralises the effectiveness of 
EEA law beyond the case at hand and will therefore not necessarily solve the problem for 
future litigants. It thus seems clear that, at present, the judicial motivations and loyalties of the 
Supreme Court do not coincide with the attitudes of interaction and adaptation that theories of 
legal pluralism call for.  
 
VII. The Icelandic legal and judicial culture creating an obstacle  
It is apparent from the examples provided in the previous chapter that Icelandic judges and 
lawyers in general do not seem to be particularly cognizant of the fact that a legal problem 
might have an “EEA dimension”. There are a number of factors which may  explain why 
courts seek to avoid involving EEA law in their reasoning, and these factors can of course be 
different in each individual case. One particular factor which will not be discussed any further 
here is  of course the unfamiliarity  with  and  complexity of European  law. Other possible 
reasons may stem from the country’s legal and judicial culture and the prevailing theory of 
legal  sources.  In  order  to  gain  a  better  overview  of  the  relationship  between  EEA  and 
Icelandic law, this chapter will venture into different aspects of the Icelandic legal culture in 
order to outline some of the possible explanations for the attitude displayed toward EEA law 
in Icelandic courts.  
 
                                                           
50 Much the same story can be run with respect to the European Convention on Human Rights.  
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1. The impact of the dualist and positivist vision of law in Iceland 
The Icelandic courts’ reluctance to use EEA law might partly stem from the fact that they are 
acting in a quite dualistic legal system. Scholars have, for instance, not been unanimous on 
whether international law should be considered one of the sources of law in Iceland. Apart 
from several decisions concerning the ECHR, the courts are unfamiliar with assuming an 
active role when it comes to international law. Hence, the courts do not have much experience 
with referring to “foreign” sources or case law coming from other than Icelandic courts. The 
fact that referring to international law is not part of the courts’ normal modus operandi might 
account  for  their  apprehension  when  it  comes  to  applying  the  far-reaching  principle  of 
consistent interpretation in order to make EEA rights operative at national level. 
Another  facet  of  the  legal  culture  which  could  help  explain  why  courts  neglect  to 
consider EEA law aspects or consult existing case law from the European Courts is the legal 
positivist tradition of applying law in Iceland, along with the legal background of Icelandic 
judges and lawyers. As in other legal systems tending to lean on a legal positivist vision of 
law,  the  modus  operandi  of  the  Icelandic  courts  is  to  view  statutory  rules,  along  with 
preparatory works,  as sources which above all others should be used to justify a judicial 
decision. Study of the case law suggests that Icelandic courts appear to have certain problems 
exercising judicial power that the EFTA Court’s judge-made principles have conferred upon 
them. This  finding corroborates the assumption that the courts prefer to  see their role as 
executors of the legislature’s intentions, rather than take on an activist role to achieve the 
effectiveness of the EEA legal system, based on a reference to general principles.
51 The fact 
that the EEA-system is in large part governed by general principles of law might thus add to 
the problem of observing EEA law’s importance at the national level.  
It emerged from the discussion above that the EFTA Court judge-made general principles 
place  major  responsibilities  on  national  courts.  One  might  not  have  expected  this 
characteristic  of  European  law  to  be  a  further  obstacle  for  Icelandic  judges  as  general 
principles of law form part of the sources of law doctrine in the Icelandic system. In theory, 
the Icelandic doctrine of the sources of law is very broad and flexible. Even though Article 61 
of the Icelandic Constitution stipulates that “judges shall be guided solely by the law” it is 
recognised  that  the  courts  can  have  recourse  to  other  sources  of  law  than  just  statutes. 
Icelandic  scholars  seem  to  agree  that  sources  of  law  can  include:  statutes,  regulations, 
                                                           
51 This does not mean that the Icelandic courts blindly rely on the legislature. In practice, the courts have 
exercised judicial control of legislation and frequently set aside unconstitutional rules when a conflict of norms 
arises. In 1943 the Supreme Court found for the first time that it was capable of reviewing the constitutionality of 
a statute (see the Hrafnkatla judgment Hrd. 1943.237). Another expression of the activist role that courts have in 
the Icelandic system is their judicial control of administrative decisions.  
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customs, precedents, analogies, principles of law and something referred to in Icelandic legal 
theory as “eðli máls”, i.e., the nature of matters (which refers to reasons of logic, fairness and 
justice). However, the sources of law are deemed to be ranked in that particular order. Other 
alternatives, such as analogies, precedents and preparatory works would thus be consulted in 
order to fill legal gaps before turning to unwritten rules, such as general principles of law. It 
should  also  be  mentioned  that  as  the  Icelandic  system  has  developed  ever  more  written 
legislation, the need to refer to general principles to fill gaps has diminished. Referring to 
general principles of law is thus not a natural part of the Icelandic courts’ judicial activity. 
The courts have furthermore seemed rather careful in their use of general principles of law, 
when no written legal sources address the situation.
52 Thus, the judiciary might not be as 
comfortable taking EEA legal principles into account in its legal interpretation as the theory 
would suggest.  
This could be seen as an effort not to enter into the legislature’s territory and upholding 
the existing institutional balance of between the legislature and the courts. Further to the 
Icelandic courts’ inclination to confine its interpretation to what is expressed in the Icelandic 
written  law  follows  their  ensuing  disinclination  to  consult  EEA  case  law.  The  exact 
requirements of EEA law are often only made clear through the case law of the EFTA Court 
and the ECJ. EU/EEA law is heavily case law based, and the greater part of this judge-made 
body of law naturally derives from the latter court. Thus, the national courts have to be aware 
of and have recourse to the legal sources of EEA law derived from the EFTA Court/ECJ case 
law. It should be recalled that the status of ECJ jurisprudence as precedents and part of the 
EFTA  States’  obligations  is  reflected  in  Article  6  EEA.
53  In  light  of  this  prescribed 
cooperation, one could have expected the Icelandic judiciary to embrace the relevant ECJ case 
precedence as legal sources when dealing with issues of EEA law. However, one can clearly 
discern a generally hesitant attitude towards the exercise of interpreting these judgments and 
applying them to the national context. The fact that the Supreme Court did not make a 
reference to the jurisprudence of the ECJ in its legal reasoning until 26 February 2001
54 (the 
judgment interpreting the Motor Vehicle Insurance Directives - see above) shows that the 
                                                           
52 When there is no written law to apply, judges have proved hesitant to base their decision only on general 
principles of law. See Sigurður Líndal, (2002), p. 231-233, who cites Hrd. 1997.1157; Hrd. 1981.182 and Hrd. 
1981.1584 as examples of the courts exercising restraint when it comes to the use of principles. 
53 Article 6 EEA states that the provisions in the EEA Agreement, in principle identical with the comparable 
provisions in the Treaty (now TFEU), are to be interpreted in accordance with the relevant rulings of the ECJ 
given prior to the date of signature of the Agreement. Conversely, Article 3(2) of the Surveillance and Court 
Agreement (SCA) stipulates that the EFTA Court shall pay “due account” to the principles laid down by the 
relevant rulings of the ECJ given after that date. 
54 Hrd. 2001.3451  
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Court is less than enthusiastic about the European case law.
55 In light of the above, it does not 
seem too bold a statement that ECJ case law either does not rec eive close examination from 
the  Supreme  Court  or  that  the  Court  is  more  inclined  to  interpret  and  apply  the  law 
independently and without regard to the ECJ’s assessment of the law. 
 
2. The impact of the implementation process on the reception of EEA law 
Article 3 of Act No. 2/1993 (EEA Act) states: “[s]tatutes and regulations shall be interpreted, 
in so far as appropriate, in accordance with the EEA Agreement and the rules deriving from 
it.” That the Icelandic courts have accepted this interpretive obligation does, however, not 
mean that the substantive rights that EEA law confers on individuals is sufficiently recognised 
in judicial proceedings. This requires that national law is to be read if at all possible to be 
consistent with directives.  The courts inevitably leave EEA law rights at risk if they do not 
observe the contents and aim of the of relevant EEA directives, when applying the national 
implementing law. This has proved to be a challenge to the Icelandic courts which are not 
very familiar with the contextual methodology. 
The method in which EEA law is implemented into national law may help provide part 
of the explanation for why judges and litigants find difficult to observe that a claim in front of 
them  has  its  roots  in  EEA  law.  In  Iceland  there  is  a  strong  tradition  for  consolidated 
legislation. This means that the prevalent method for implementing directives into Icelandic 
law is by means of reformulation, also known as transformation. The substantial content of 
the directive which requires implementation is, therefore, transformed into domestic law and 
actually becomes domestic law. It is usually drafted directly in the text of an existing statute 
or administrative regulation without copying its exact wording. When the text of directives is 
reproduced or reformulated in consolidated legislation, the EEA roots of a provision to be 
applied by the courts may be curtailed. In particular when the text of the statutory law which 
is an implementation of a directive differs drastically from the directive, it may be difficult to 
ascertain  the  importance  of  relevant  arguments  based  on  EEA  law  and  that  one  should 
perhaps  have  recurrence  to  the  case  law  of  the  ECJ/EFTA  Court  when  interpreting  the 
contents of the statutory law. The concerns raised over the use of the transformation method 
are  indeed  justified  as  it  can  pose  great  problems  in  practical  judicial  life.  Firstly,  the 
technique can exclude a sufficiently precise and unconditional provision of a directive from 
                                                           
55 Curiously, when it finally came to invoking an ECJ judgment, the Supreme Court did so in order to point out 
discrepancies between the decisions of the EFTA Court and the ECJ, and raise doubts as to the correct 
interpretation of the directive - which in turn strengthened its reasoning for disregarding the ruling of the EFTA 
Court.  
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being applied by the Icelandic courts in the national legal system. If the text of the provision 
is greatly altered in the transformation process, the national rule that is an implementation of a 
directive might not have the capacity to grant the individual the exact legal position which the 
directive intended to grant him.
56 Secondly, the technique can make it difficult to detect when 
EEA law rights and obligations should become operative at national level through consistent 
interpretation. 
 
3. The role of the parties in raising EEA law arguments 
Here, the reliance placed by the Icelandic courts on the parties themselves to plead EEA law 
arguments will be discussed. If a party fails to claim that a certain national provision should 
be interpreted in a specific manner in the light of EEA law, it is quite understandable that the 
court does not address the issue.
57  
The national court’s willingness to raise EEA law issues and interpret national law in the 
light of EEA law on its own motion will largely depend on the nature of the proceedings. As a 
rule, the courts would be more restrictive in civil law proceedings which mostly leave the 
litigation  in  the  hands  of  the  parties.  According  to  the  principle  of  party  autonomy 
(málsforræðisreglan) in civil law suits, it is up to the parties to make a specific claim and to 
allege and present the necessary facts/circumstances to be used as grounds for the case.
58 
Likewise  it  rests  with  the  parties  to  argue  under  what  specific  legal  rules  the 
facts/circumstances are to be subsumed.
59 This means that the court must remain within the 
scope of the dispute as set by the parties to the proceedings. The principle of party autonomy 
in civil law is reflected in Article 111(1) and (2) of the Icelandic Code of Civil Procedure No. 
91/1991, which elucidates that the court’s ruling may not be based upon facts and/or claims 
other than those presented by the parties.
60 The text of Article 111, however, does not include 
legal arguments. It has been distracted from the provision, read e contrario, that the court is 
not bound by the parties’ legal qualification of the factual circumstances.
61 The Icelandic 
                                                           
56 It should, however be recalled that if the courts cannot grant an individual his EEA law rights on the basis of 
the implementing national law in the on-going proceedings, the individual might have the possibility to protect 
his right through a subsequent claim for compensation in state liability proceedings. 
57 Hence, the expertise of a legal counsel, literate in European law, is of great importance in proceedings which 
possibly involve EEA law matters. 
58 See Articles 80(1)(e) and 99(2) of the Icelandic Code of Civil Procedure No. 91/1991. It is also up to the 
parties to provide the evidence in those cases, see Article 46(1) of the Icelandic Code of Civil Procedure No. 
91/1991. 
59 See Articles 80(1)(f) and 99(2) of the Icelandic Code of Civil Procedure No. 91/1991. 
60 The Article, however, contains an exception to the rule and states that the court may go beyond the ambit of 
the dispute in order to examine issues which it should guard on its own motion. Such issues only concern formal 
aspects such as the admissibility of the action. 
61 Markús Sigurbjörnsson, Einkamálaréttarfar (2nd edition). ( Úlfljótur, Reykjavík 2003), 23 and 172.  
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Code of Civil Procedure thus reflects the principle of jura novit curia which refers to the 
presumption that the court knows the law. The judge has the power to apply legal rules on its 
own motion and will have to determine for himself the content and true aim of the governing 
law. The parties cannot bind the court in matters of law.
62 The principle of jura novit curia 
does, however, not limit the parties’ procedural autonomy to a large extent in practice. The 
court has to stick strictly to the grounds as brought forward by the parties, and is not allowed 
to take into account legal questions that are not mentioned.
63  
According to the principle of jura novit curia, the parties should not have to present 
evidence  to  prove  what  the  law  is.  It  is  presumed  that  the  court  has  that  knowledge.
 
Exceptions to the rule are, however, provided for in Article 44(2) of the Icelandic Code of 
Civil Procedure No. 91/1991. The two exceptions are that in matters of “foreign” law and 
matters of Icelandic customary law. These matters are to be regarded in the same manner as 
facts, and the judge must therefore rely on the claimant invoking a rule of foreign law or 
Icelandic customary law and to lead evidence proving its existence (the exception therefore 
relates to the proof of the law and not to its interpretation or application). The significant 
reliance placed on the parties in matters of EEA law suggests that they are treated similar to 
foreign law to some degree.
  The exception concerning foreign law should however not cover 
matters  concerning  EEA  law  since  it  is  a  general  principle  only.  An  exception  to  this 
exception is, for instance, to be found in Article 3 of the Icelandic EEA Act and the related 
jurisprudence  clarifying  that  EEA  law  is  to  be  used  as  an  important  means  to  interpret 
domestic law. 
Where does this analysis leave arguments based on EEA law in the Icelandic courts? One 
could hold that the exercise of interpreting national law in the light of EEA law is a question 
of law and it is up to the court in question to find what the law is in accordance with the 
principle jura novit curia. The judge therefore not only has the discretionary power, but a 
mandatory  requirement  to  evaluate  implementing  national  legislation  in  the  light  of  the 
substance of a directive on its own motion if EEA law elements appear in the case. Only 
invoking EEA law to interpret the legal rules under which invoked circumstances and facts 
are to be subsumed does not mean that the court goes beyond the proceedings as set by the 
parties. On this conclusion, a party that claims that a specific right should be available to him 
should not have to allege or prove that Icelandic law should be interpreted to be consistent 
with EEA law. The judge is obliged to know what the law is and whether the party has a right 
under the specific circumstances. 
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On the other hand, when it comes to EEA law, it can prove difficult to find out what the 
law is. In relation to inconsistencies of law between national and EEA law, the supposition 
that courts know the law becomes problematic because of the complexity involved when it 
comes  to  interpreting  EEA  law.  In  cases  of  such  uncertainty,  the  national  courts  can,  of 
course, use the advisory opinion proceedings. However, it should also be taken into account 
that other reasons than “knowledge deficit” can account for why a party may choose to keep 
EEA law out of the proceedings. A party’s reliance upon EEA might result in a possible 
referral of a question to the EFTA Court which might lengthen and render the proceedings 
very costly for the party. The party might also have taken the conscious decision to withhold 
such arguments because he believes a more favourable result can be reached by leaving EEA 
material outside of the proceedings. Thus, at least in civil law proceedings, the discretion 
involved in certain EEA law interpretive exercises would favour treating EEA law as facts, 
whereby it will have to be pleaded and proved by the parties. I.e. it would argue against 
extending the jura novit curia principle to the knowledge of EEA law. 
Lastly, it should be noted that even though the courts are required to interpret Icelandic 
law in the light of the wording and purpose of EEA law (Article 3 of the Icelandic EEA Act) 
and that such an interpretive exercise in theory would fall under the principle of jura novit 
curia, it is of course safer to expressly guide the national court to that basis for the right. As 
the courts sometimes seem reluctant to ascribe significance to EEA law even in cases where 
one of the parties actually sustains having such rights, it would behoove the party to not 
merely refer to EEA legislation in appreciation of the legal situation, but also cite case law 
from the ECJ/EFTA Court and general principles as well as doctrine supporting its claim. “If 
the mountain will not come to Mohammed, Mohammed must go to the mountain”. Just like 
Mohammed had to resign himself to going to the Mountain, so must the legal representative 
take the initiative to detect and raise the EEA law facets of the case. 
 
VIII. Adoption of a Pluralist Conception of Law in the EFTA States 
The previous chapter shows that the habitual methods of judicial reasoning and application of 
law  in  the  Icelandic  courts  can  obviously  have  a  fragmenting  effect.  Hence,  a  suitable 
framework  within  which  the  courts  exercise  their  discretion  is  not  only  desirable  but 
objectively  necessary  for  the  proper  functioning  of  the  EEA  system.  How  then  can  we 
integrate  the  EEA  vision  into  the  Icelandic  dualist  context  without  deferring  to,  or 
surrendering sovereignty rights to the EEA order?   
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When adjusted to the circumstances of the EEA, Maduro’s method is instructive in how 
to  handle  the  multi-layered  system  of  norms,  and  decide  their  interrelation,  scope  and 
circumstances  for  application.  The  idea  of  contrapunctual  law  raises  the  possibility  of 
harmonising conflicting values and interests. It is the result of an interpretive effort made by 
courts from different jurisdictions sharing the same commitment “to engage in a coherent 
construction of a common legal order.”
64 Maduro draws an illustrative example of how this 
coherence is analogous to the way different musical melodies can be harmonised: 
 
Counterpoint  is  the  musical  method  of  harmonising  different  melodies  that  are  not  in  a 
hierarchical relationship among them. The discovery that different melodies could be heard at the 
same time in a harmonic manner was one of the greatest developments in musical history and 
greatly enhanced the art and pleasure of music. In law too, we have to learn how to manage the 
non-hierarchical relationship between different legal orders and institutions and to discover how 
to gain from the diversity and choices that are offered to us without generating conflicts that 
ultimately will destroy those legal orders and the values they sustain.
65  
 
If we try to capture Maduro’s transposition of counterpoint to legal orders and relate it to our 
subject matter, an analogy could be drawn between a judge deciding matters of EEA law and 
a  musician  playing  in  a  group.  The  musician  must  simultaneously  play  his  part  while 
understanding how his  part fit into the overall structure of the song and how what he is 
playing is being perceived and interpreted by the other members of the group. Similarly, the 
contrapunctual principles ask the judge, when deciding a case relating to EEA law, to function 
as a musician playing to the tune of a broader European legal order: rather than reasoning 
solely from the perspective of his own legal order, he has to be sensitive to how his decision 
will fit into the EEA legal order as a whole and how it will be perceived and interpreted by 
the judges of a different legal order.  
It is clear that such a project would require changes in the way that judges perceive of 
their institutional role and responsibility. One consequence of the opening up the legal system 
to competing considerations is that legal reasoning will grow more complex and multilayered. 
If we recall Maduro’s second contrapunctual principle, “the law arising from the regulation of 
transnational situations ends up being a product of the interaction between different national 
and  international  legal  orders.”  Therefore,  national  judges  must  reason  and  justify  their 
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65 Miguel Maduro, supra note 12, 524-525.  
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decisions “in the context of the global legal order in which they are impacting.” Bengoetxea, 
MacCormick and Soriano have perfectly framed the conception of contextual interpretation: 
 
Constructive interpretation has to be highly sensitive to context, and the context of any particular 
act of legal interpretation is the need to find a way of making sense of a text in the context of a 
large-scale normative scheme. This cannot be a matter of trying to read the meaning of a set of 
words taken in isolation. For any paragraph or article of a Treaty or of a Regulation or Directive 
has to be read in the setting of the whole Treaty scheme.
66 
 
As within the Member States, the contextual or legal pluralistic approach assumes a particular 
importance in the EFTA States. This does not mean that the national courts should adopt the 
dynamic and creative legal interpretation of the EFTA Court. Although national courts of the 
EFTA States have a duty in common with the EFTA Court, to see that EEA law is respected, 
the  two  courts  serve  different  normative  ambitions.
67  It  is  important  to  stress  that  this 
interpretive task is exercised in normal proceedings, within the framework of the national 
system of remedial and procedural rules. Since EEA-based law relies upon the procedures and 
remedies of the EFTA States for enforcement, the contextual approach does not signify a 
transformation of the judiciary’s legal method. It, however, requires the judges to grasp the 
different dynamics when the litigation concerns European-related affairs, and adjusting to the 
obligations of the EEA system. 
In this regard, it is of utmost importance that the national courts are familiar with the 
principle of consistent interpretation (indirect effect) and the vast scope of application that the 
principle has. Some further remarks to this extent are thus warranted.  
It is critical to the success of implementing legislation that the origin and context of 
rights  emanating  from  EEA  law  is  observed.  In  practice,  the  two  systems  operate  in  a 
symbiosis and the interpretation of this legislation at the national level must not take place in 
a legal  vacuum.  Law is intrinsically  contextual and simply  cannot  be  interpreted in  such 
                                                           
66 Joxerramon Bengoetxea, Neil MacCormick, and Moral Soriano, I. ‘Integration and Integrity in the Legal 
Reasoning of the European Court of Justice’, in G. De Burca and J.H.H. Weiler (eds) The European Court of 
Justice. (Oxford University Press, 2001), 43-85, at 45. 
67 The national contextual approach and the teleological method have a common approach in that they both 
advocate the interpretation of a rule within its wider context. However, they differ in that the teleological method 
does not end there. See on this Paul Craig, and De Búrca, G, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (3rd edition) 
(Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), commenting on the teleological interpretation of the ECJ 
(and by extension the EFTA Court): “Often this is very far from a literal interpretation of the Treaty or of 
legislation in question, even to the extent of flying in the face of the expressed language.” The national courts 
obviously do not have the same incentive to take the development of EU/EEA law into consideration. Thus, the 
contextual approach of the national courts and the teleological method of the European Courts represent two 
different approaches towards law and the one is not to be equalled with the other.  
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hermetically closed compartments. In order for the national court to reach a well-balanced 
result,  it  might  therefore  have  to  see  both  sides  of  the  coin  and  undertake  a  “double” 
evaluation.  It  must  firstly  adopt  the  EEA  perspective  and  grasp  what  the  EEA  directive 
requires in the case at hand. Such an evaluation might require the court to examine not only 
the directives but also the case law of the ECJ/EFTA Court as such case law can significantly 
influence the meaning of provisions contained in the directive. Secondly, it must appreciate 
whether it can be used in the case at hand, i.e. whether the national measure relating to the 
directive is to be used to the same effects. Certain courts might be unfamiliar with such a 
method of interpretation or find that such activity runs  counter to their judicial function. 
However,  it  should  be  stressed  that  when  there  is  space  to  interpret  domestic  law  to  be 
compatible with EEA law, judges are under an EEA and national legal obligation to ensure 
compliance. Keeping this in mind, there might not always be a need for a perfect national 
transformation  rule  describing  the  exact  material  right  or  legal  position  created  by  the 
directive.  I.e.  the  judge  might  be  able  to  give  the  directive  effect  through  consistent 
interpretation.
68 
To what extent courts can use EEA law for the purpose of consistent interpretation would 
vary greatly depending on the type of action and the body of domestic law in the case at issue. 
National courts have leeway to adjust these matters in light of the circumstances of the case 
and  concern  for  an  individual’s  right.  All  in  all,  the  effort  required  of  national  courts  is 
adapting their methodologies in order to interpret the law within its broader context, matching 
the ideals of both the national and the EEA systems. The pluralist approach could thus be said 
to be concerned with rendering the law and the broader or common European legal system 
effective rather than being understood exclusively in terms of protecting rights under EEA 
law. National courts might also have to take other interests and aims into account, even if this 
might be to the detriment of the EEA right-bearer (e.g., legal certainty and party autonomy). 
In short, the courts must reach the best interpretation of the EEA legal system as a whole. 
In order to safeguard coherence, Maduro then pushes the matter further and states that 
“the  normative  goals  of  rules  and  their  connection  to  the  overall  value  system”  must  be 
articulated by the judges in order to “set the stage for a substantive discussion.”
69 This is, in 
essence,  the  principle  of  universalisability.  EU/EEA  law  unavoidably  leads  to  increasing 
homogeneization  of  legal  problems  in  different  jurisdictions.  In  order  to  promote 
                                                           
68 This, of course, only applies when EEA law rights are litigated and the legal position falls within the scope of 
the Directive. If the law is applied also to other legal positions which are governed by Icelandic law, there is no 
obligation to apply the principle of consistent interpretation. 
69 Miguel Maduro, ‘Legal Reasoning and Judicial Adjudication at the European Court of Justice’, Paper 
presented as part of the proceedings for the Cardozo/NYU/I•CON Colloquium, March 2010, 19.  
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homogeneous  responses  to  those  problems,  the  universalisability  principle  suggests  that 
judges  refrain  from  concealing  the  EEA  law  basis  of  their  decisions.  By  articulating  the 
European law basis of their decision, the courts become characters in  the unfolding of a 
dialogue. As such, they allow other courts to carry out a comparative analysis and look for 
solutions in their decision. Although judges reason from their points of principle, the framing 
of the narrative in a purely domestic matter gives rise to isolationistic solutions, which would 
impede judicial cooperation across the EEA area. 
Furthermore,  it  is  of  fundamental  importance  for  the  legal  development  and 
Europeanization in the particular EFTA States that the Supreme Court takes the opportunities 
that present themselves to address the EEA law issues and use the case law from the European 
Courts  in  its  reasoning.  It  must  take  the  responsibility  to  develop  case  law  and  create 
precedents  in  order  to  clarify  the  effect  of  EEA  law  for  the  district  courts,  lawyers  and 
academics. The district  courts are not likely to  take on the responsibility to facilitate the 
application of EEA law, if the Supreme Court continues to avoid arguments made on that 
basis. The legal mentality, on part of the academics and officials employed in the legal sector 
in Iceland, is also not likely to adapt to the EEA system any time soon if the Supreme Court 
refuses  to  consider  the  complex  legal  issues  connected  to  EEA  law  and  transpose  the 
European case law down to the national level. Lastly, an open discussion of the European law 
aspects of a claimant’s argument is also of utmost importance for his individual right. This is 
so even if it is only to dismiss them, as he will accept the ruling as final and feel that all his 
arguments have been taken into consideration. 
 
IX. Conclusion 
The case law analysed in this paper serves as a reminder that certain difficulties pertain for 
Icelandic courts to grasp the dynamics and methodology to employ when acting as protector 
of EEA law rights. It was concluded that Icelandic courts encounter difficulties when having 
to give effect to EEA law general principles of law, to identify the EEA aspects of cases and 
apply a more pragmatic contextual approach to determine the scope and contents of those 
rights. It noted that the complex legal reality of EEA law results in courts preferring to apply 
the familiar national rules, the contents of which they are certain. Chapter 7 then went on to 
discuss a number of elements of the Icelandic legal culture which could help us understand 
the attitudes towards EEA law in Icelandic courts. It was observed that the Icelandic system 
has  a positivist understanding of the law. As a result, the methodology  and  reasoning in 
judicial  practice  is  to  find  answers  in  statutory  rules  and  their  preparatory  works.  This  
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adherence to a positivist use of the law has arguably left the Icelandic courts unprepared to 
give EEA law - which is largely dependent on case law and general principles – its required 
effect.  The judges do not always recognise the impact of EEA law in case a right is laid down 
in an EEA law directive, or observe that the EFTA Court or ECJ case law should be consulted 
as a source of interpretation. Hence, the judicial protection in Iceland is often confined to 
what is expressed in the Icelandic written law. It was noted that the courts’ avoidance of the 
matter is not only regrettable because of the missed opportunity to create a precedent on the 
matter in Icelandic case law, but for the general development of EEA law in general. In other 
instances, however, the fault does not lie with the judges, but rather with the parties who have 
neglected to raise and address EEA law in the cases where it is of importance (see supra 
section 7.3).  
Chapter 8 demonstrates that the lawyers and judges will need to adjust some of their 
habitual methodology in order to take on a different role in judicial proceedings concerning 
EEA law matters – one which complies with European standards. It was argued that Maduro’s 
theory is instructive in how to handle the multi-layered system of norms, and to decide their 
relationship  and circumstances  for application.  His  contrapunctual model  of interpretation 
promotes  changes  in  the  judicial  style  from  more  positivistic,  text-oriented  legal 
interpretation, to a more contextual reasoning. It would furthermore prefer that the Supreme 
Court openly makes clear what role EEA law might play in its decisions, especially if the 
parties have based their reasoning on EEA law. 
 However, the pluralist theory does not elaborate any concrete solution to the problem of 
conflicts  of  a  legal  nature  between  the  EEA  and  Icelandic  systems.  It  is  inherent  in  the 
pluralist conception that it does not impose unity but allows us to maintain uncertainty as to 
the decision of which norm takes precedence. I.e. the approach is not about enforcing the laws 
emanating from the Agreement at any price, so that all national interests standing in the way 
must give in. The judges thus have some scope for flexibility in making those decisions in 
view of the circumstances or the case. 
The pluralist theory can therefore be said to deepen the thought on this important matter 
rather than to resolve it. This is not to say that it has no normative consequences whatsoever 
on the decisions made by the courts. Although the theory described so far does not prescribe a 
solution to genuine collisions between legal orders, it is valuable in that it offers a framework 
for  thinking  of  the  relationship  between  the  two  orders  other  than  in  the  traditional 
conservative  form.  It  provides  pragmatic  tools  designed  to  enhance  co-operation  and 
adaptability, thus making the national legal system more open and susceptible to the EEA  
32 
legal  order.  This  interaction  can,  however,  only  continue  up  to  a  certain  point  and  the 
Icelandic system’s adaptability to the EEA system will eventually reach a stopping-point at 
which collisions between the two need to be addressed. Accepting a pluralist view of the 
relationship between the Icelandic and the EEA practice is only the first step towards entering 
the forum where the question of conflict awaits. As MacCormick comments: 
 
“[Collisions] are possible, but not inevitable. How likely they are depends on the wisdom with 
which interested parties approach problem-situations, and the theoretical resources available to 
them in approaching them.”
70 
 
To take full advantage of the values of legal pluralism, we need to discover a passage from 
theory to practice. Its value becomes persuasive for national courts only within the framework 
of the respective national legal system. Thusly, the viewpoint that matters for such an inquiry 
is that of domestic law. For our purposes it is the function of legal scholarship in Iceland to 
propose  “theoretical  resources”  to  the  national  judge  for  approaching  potential  conflicts 
between  norms  originating  from  EEA  law  and  Icelandic  law.  These  resources  must 
accommodate the needs of the EEA legal order while respecting the Icelandic constitutional 
framework  in  which  the  courts  operate.  Such  a  study,  which  attempts  to  formulate  a 
normative theory of interpretation of EEA law within the Icelandic system, however, reaches 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
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